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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LYNN R. PREECE, ) 
) 
Plaintiff and ) 
Appellant, ) 
) 
vs. ) Case No. 18295 
) 
MARK v. PREECE, ) 
) 
Defendant and ) 
Respondent, ) 
) 
REPLY BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action of divorce by Lynn R. Preece, Plaintiff 
and Appellant (herein called Appellant) against Mark v. 
Preece, Defendant and Respondent (herein called Respondent). 
DISPOSITION BY THE TRIAL COURT 
A divorce trial was held on October 27, 1981, where 
personally appeared the Appellant and her attorney and the 
Respondent and his attorney. The Court, at the conclusion 
of the trial, granted a Decree of Divorce to Appellant 
setting forth the terms to be included therein, waiving the 
interlocutory period and making the same final upon signing. 
Appellant's attorney prepared the Findings of Facts, Conclusions 
of Law and Decree and mailed those to counsel for the Respondent. 
Respondent's attorney questioned one provision in the Findings 
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as not being a part of the oral order of the court, and 
submitted the documents by letter to the trial judge for 
signature with a request that the paragraph in question in 
the Findings be deleted. There was no concern regarding the 
wording of the Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce. 
Before the trial court could decide whether the paragraph in 
question in the Findings of Fact should be included or not, 
the Respondent died. Counsel for the Respondent petitioned 
the Court for a judgment nunc pro tune, which the Court, 
after oral argument by the attorneys for the parties, granted. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to enforce the judgment nunc pro tune 
of the Divorce Decree granted by the Trial Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties were married on March 4, 1976 (Trial Transcript, 
p. 3), it being the Appellant's fourth marriage (Trial 
Transcript, p. 26) and the Respondent's third marriage 
(Trial Transcript, p. 26). Appellant sold land that she 
owned in Weber County, Utah prior to the marriage and from 
the net equity of $7,800 helped to purchase a trailer home 
in which the parties lived with their separate families by 
prior marriages on a family farm which the Respondent operated 
in Cache County, Utah (Trial Transcript, pp. 4-5). The farm 
in Cache County, Utah where the trailer was located was land 
where Respondent had been born and was acquired by the 
Respondent in a deed from his parents in 1975 wherein his 
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parents retained life estate interests (Trial Transcript p. 
10). Appellant knew how title was held at the time of the 
marriage (Trial Transcript, p. 28). Respondent's mother 
died on June 26, 1977 (Trial Transcript, p. 49), and his 
father died on February a, 1979 (Trial Transcript pp. 29 and 
50). Appellant's name was never placed on the title of the 
land (Trial Transcript, p. 20). The parties separated 
August 1, 1979, (Trial Transcript, p. 17) and had not even 
seen each other since August of 1980 (Trial Transcript, p. 
65). Appellant requested the divorce be finalized immediately 
(Trial Transcript, p. 4} and testified there was no- possibility 
of reconciliation (Trial Transcript, p. 21). The farmland 
was appraised for the divorce trial as worth $143,000 as of 
the time of the divorce trial (Ex. 3). Any increase in the 
value of the land from the time of the marriage to the time 
of separation and later the divorce was due to natural 
appreciation (Ex. 3). 
The Court, after hearing all the evidence, granted a 
decree of divorce, making the same final on signing, and 
made an order relative to the return of certain property, 
awarded to Appellant a judgment for her investment in 
certain items of personal property and a share of the natural 
appreciation of the land during the time the parties lived 
together, restored to Appellant her prior married name, 
ordered Respondent to assume certain debts, and ordered each 
party to pay their own expenses and costs (Trial Transcript, 
p. 79-84). 
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Appellant's counsel mailed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Decree which he had prepared on November 12 1981. 
Respondent's attorney received the documents on November 14, 
1981 (see p. 34 of Court's file). Respondent's attorney 
mailed those documents to his client for his review before 
approval and received a call from Respondent several days 
later indicating that the Respondent had been ill and hospitalized 
with a jaundice problem, so arrangements were made for the 
Respondent and his attorney to visit at the hospital for 
Respondent to review the papers, approve them as to form 
and better understand the Order. Everything was agreed in 
the papers as to form except for paragraph 9 of the Findings 
of Fact, which stated: "That the Plaintiff has retained 
Attorney Pete N. Vlahos to represent her and has incurred 
reasonalbe [sic] attorney fees and costs." 
Because this was not a major disagreement and really 
had no impact on the written Conclusions and Decree, counsel 
chose to mail the documents with a letter to the Court on 
December 3, 1981, asking the Court to strike the said 
paragraph in the Findings as he signed all the documents. There 
was no formal motion filed and no further testimony and 
argument were necessary because the trial had been completed. 
On the same day that the papers were mailed to the trial 
judge, the Respondent suddenly died of a heart attack unrelated 
to the illness for which he had been hospitalized. 
Respondent's counsel immediately petitioned the Trial 
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Court for a nunc pro tune order entering the Divorce Decree. 
The Court upon hearing argument and briefs of counsel, 
granted the nunc pro tune order, making the divorce effective 
as of the date of the hearing and oral order, to-wit: 
October 27, 1981. The effect of said hearing was to deny 
the Appellant the position of a surviving spouse in the 
Respondent's intestate probate estate. Therefore~ she could 
not claim the position of personal representative or statutory 
interest as a surviving spouse in the Preece family farm, 
thus allowing the family farm to pass under the intestate 
law to the Respondent's three natural born childreri_from a 
previous marriage and leaving to the Appellant her claim 
against the estate for the amount awarded to her by Judge 
Christoffersen after the trial on her divorce complaint. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT HAS THE POWER TO GRANT 
A DECREE OF DIVORCE BY MEANS OF A NUNC 
PRO TUNC PETITION. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 58A(d) specifically 
provides for such a case and states: 
If a party dies after a verdict or.decision 
upon any issue of fact and before Judgment, 
judgment may nevertheless be rendered 
thereon. 
The authority of a court to enter a judgment nunc pro tune 
exists at common law and is not dependent upon statute. The 
powers of discretion should not be exercised where to do so 
would injuriously affect the intervening rights of third 
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parties or otherwise cause injustice. But on the other 
I 
hand, should be exercised where injustice would occur if not 
done and where the material facts were decided in the manner 
recognized by law. See 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments, paragraphs 
97, 98, 196 and 223. The Trial Court in this case, on which· 
sat the trial judge who heard the divorce matter, granted 
the Petition after considering the file, hearing arguments 
of counsel, certainly had the jurisdiction and power to 
grant the Divorce Decree as a judgment nunc pro tune, under 
the rule cited above, and supplemented by the inherent power 
of the Court under common law. 
II 
THE DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN 
ENTERING THE JUDGMENT NUNC PRO TUNC IN 
THIS CASE SHOULD BE AFFIRMED FOR THE 
FOLLOWING REASONS: 
A. THE MATTER BE 1rWEEN THE PARTIES WAS 
FULLY AND COMPLETELY ADJUDICATED AT A 
TRIAL AND A FINAL ORDER HAD BEEN GRANTED, 
WITH THE SOLE REMAINING ACTION BEING 
MERELY TO SIGN THE PAPERS. 
B. GROSS INJUSTICE AND INEQUITY WILL 
OCCUR IF THE COURT FAILS TO RECOGNIZE 
THE JUDGMENT NUNC PRO TUNC, AS SUCH ACTION 
WILL AWARD AN INTEREST TO A LONG-TIME 
FAMILY FARM TO THE APPELLANT, 
A WIFE OF SHORT DURATION, AND ACQUIRED 
PRIOR TO THIS MARRIAGE AS AGAINST 
RESPONDENT'S NATURAL CHILDREN WHO WANT TO 
CONTINUE THE FAMILY FARMING OPERATION. 
C. THE ISSUE RAISED BY APPELLANT IN 
HER BRIEF THAT THERE WERE STILL UNDECIDED 
ISSUES BEFORE THE DECREE COULD BE SIGNED 
WAS NEVER PROPERLY RAISED BEFORE 
THE TRIAL COURT AND THEREFORE THE APPELLANT 
SHOULD BE FORECLOSED OF RAISING THAT ISSUE 
ON APPEAL. 
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A. THE MATTER BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS 
FULLY AND COMPLETELY ADJUDICATED AT A 
TRIAL AND A FINAL ORDER HAD BEEN GRANTED, 
WITH THE SOLE REMAINING ACTION BEING 
MERELY TO SIGN THE PAPERS. 
The issue of divorce and the property settlement 
between the parties was fully litigated on October 27, 1981, 
and the verbal order of the Court was made, making the 
Divorce Decree final between the parties subject only to the 
documents being drafted by the attorneys and signed by the 
Court. The parties had been separated and living apart for 
over two years after only three years of marriage. The only 
matter still pending was the signing of the documents by the 
Court after a question had been resolved over the appropriateness 
of paragraph 9 of the Findings. Appellant's attorney at 
trial presented evidence of attorney fees (Trial Transcript, 
pp. 22-23), but the Court clearly ordered each party to pay 
their own attorney fees (Trial Transcript, p. 82, and Appellant's 
Conclusions of Law, paragraph 9, and Decree of Divorce, 
paragraph 8). There were no motions filed. The prepared 
documents were submitted to the Court with a request to 
strike paragraph 9 of the Findings as they were not Findings 
made by the Court. There was no need of any further testimony 
or oral argument. The Court could decide by checking the 
record. 
It is for a case like this that Rule 58A(d), Utah 
Rules of civil Procedure, cited above and the use of nunc 
pro tune orders are really designed to meet. Numerous state 
courts have followed this procedure. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the case of In re Tahery, 14 Wash.App. 27, 540 P.2d 
474 (1975), the Court found that the trial court has the 
inherent discretionary power to enter judgment nunc pro tune 
even with a divorce action. The Court also cited equitable 
considerations in granting the nunc pro tune order and cited 
the following from H. Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations, 
384 (1968): 
One final rule governing parties to 
divorce suits says that the death of 
a party at any time before the entry of 
the final decree abates the action 
automatically. This result occurs even 
though the death foll.ows an interlocutory 
decree of divorce. It does not, however,-
where the case was fully adjudicated so 
that a final decree should have been 
entered before the death of a party but 
the decree was not in fact entered for 
some reason. In this unusual situation 
a divorce decree nunc pro tune may be 
entered. (Emphasis added.) 
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in the 
case of Cameron v. Cameron, 105 w.va. 621, 143 S.E. 349 
(1928}, held that a decree of divorce nunc pro tune was 
proper where, as in our case, everything had been done but 
for the signing of the papers. That Court noted the difference 
where the decree was interlocutory and death occurred before 
it was scheduled to become final. 
The Supreme Court of Ohio cited the article at 104 ALR 
654 at page 664 as authority for a similar holding in the 
case of Caprita v. Caprita, 145 Ohio St. 5, 60 N.E.2d 483 
(1945): 
The general rule, so far as a general 
rule may be deduced from the few cases 
falling within this subdivision, is that, if 
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the fac~s ~ustifying the entry of a decree 
were ad]ud1cated during the lifetime of the 
parties to a divorce action, so that a 
decree was rendered or could or should have 
been rendered thereon immediately, but for 
some reason was not entered as such on the 
judgment record, the death of one of the 
part~e~ to the action subsequently to the 
rendition thereof, but before it is in fact 
entered upon the record, does not prevent 
the entry of a decree nunc pro tune to take 
effect as of a time prior to the death of 
the party. 
The cases cited thereafter support Respondent's position 
in this case. 
Appellant's cases are not in point. The cases of 
Wilson v. Wilson, 73 Mich. 620, 41 N.W. 817 (1889)} Sahler v. Sahler 
17 So.2d 105 (Fla. 1944); and Heil v. Rogers, 369 s.W.2d 388 
(Kansas City Ct. of Appeals, Missouri 1959), involved cases 
where the matter was still under advisement or no final 
pronouncement was made when a party died. In the case of 
State ex rel Tufton v. Superior Court, 46 Wash. 395, 90 P. 
258 (1907), the Court relied on the long delay by the party 
seeking relief and ruled he was estopped. The case of 
Mabry v. Baird, 203 Okla. 2112, 219 P.2d 234 (1950), actually 
allowed the divorce decree to be entered and allowed additional 
evidence on the issue of attorney fee~ to be included in a 
hearing after death. The case of Daly v. Daly, 533 P.2d 884 
(Utah 1975), involved a case where death occurred during the 
interlocutory period. That is different from this case 
where the Court waived the interlocutory period and made 
the Decree final upon signing. See Cameron v. Cameron, 
cited above. The undersigned submits that if the Court, 
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despite this clear distinction, finds that the Daly case is 
controlling, then this Court should overrule the~ case 
and follow Rule 58A(d) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
leave the matter to the discretion of the Trial Court, which 
is in a better position to decide whether a death before the 
final docketing of the final order is a sufficient change of 
circumstances to warrant a change, of the oral order. 
Finally, the case of Glad v. Glad, 567 P.2d 160 (Utah 
1977), involved filing motions objecting to Findings and 
Conclusions. This case involved a letter to the Court to 
strike one paragraph from the Findings as not being covered 
by the ruling of the Court. It may have delayed the actual 
signing of the papers for several days but in light of the 
long separation of the parties and the case being decided at 
the trial this short delay was meaningless. 
This case was as final after the hearing on October 27, 
1981, as a divorce case can be. The attorneys had even 
agreed on the wording for the Conclusions of Law and the 
Decree. 
B. GROSS INJUSTICE AND INEQUITY WILL 
OCCUR IF THE COURT FAILS TO RECOGNIZE 
THE JUDGMENT NUNC PRO TUNC, AS SUCH ACTION 
WILL AWARD AN INTEREST OT A LONG-TERM 
FAMILY FARM TO THE APPELLANT, 
A WIFE OF SHORT DURATION, AND ACQUIRED 
PRIOR TO THIS MARRIAGE AS AGAINST 
RESPONDENT 1 S NATURAL CHILDREN WHO WANT TO 
CONTINUE THE FAMILY FARMING OPERATION. 
It appears to the undersigned that the sole reason that 
the Appellant objects to the nunc pro tune order is to get a 
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greater share of the Respondent's estate as his surviving 
widow than she received under the Divorce Decree after the 
trial. There appears no desire to return and operate the 
family farm or help Respondent's children as their stepmother. 
Appellant herself sought to have the divorce made final upon 
the hearing, indicating as grounds for the divorce her 
problems with Respondent's children (Trial Transcript, p. 
70). In not sustaining the Trial Court's action, this Court 
would increase the Appellant's claim against Respondent's 
estate from the $14,605 set at trial to one-half of the 
Respondent's estate(§ 75-2-102(1)(3) Utah Code Ann. (1953) 
as amended}, of which the family farm at least is included 
with an appraisal value as of October 27, 1981, of $143,000 
(Ex. 3), to the detriment of the three natural children of 
the Respondent, who, without the claim of the Appellant, 
would inherit the family farm. Respondent could have prevented 
this by a will or prenuptial agreement, but as happens in so 
many cases, he certainly had no foreknowledge of a divorce 
or a sudden death. His hospitalization was not life-threatening. 
A divorce action is one of equity. The rules clearly 
provide that the Court has the power to enter a Divorce 
Decree where judgment was rendered but not signed before 
death. By sustaining the action of the Trial Court, the 
natural object of a person's family farm went to the persons 
that Respondent would want it to go to. 
_,,_ 
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C. THE ISSUE RAISED BY APPELLANT IN 
HER BRIEF THAT THERE WERE STILL UNDECIDED 
ISSUES BEFORE THE DECREE COULD BE SIGNED 
WAS NEVER PROPERLY RAISED BEFORE 
THE TRIAL COURT AND THEREFORE THE APPELLANT 
SHOULD BE FORECLOSED OF RAISING THAT ISSUE 
ON APPEAL. 
The undersigned directs the Court to the issues raised 
by the Appellant in resisting the Respondent's motion for a 
judgment nunc pro tune (see Court File, pp. 43-60). Appellant 
claims basically that the Court is without jurisdiction to 
grant such an order because of Respondent's death before 
the Divorce Decree was signed (Court's File, pp. 43-60). 
Further, in the transcript of the oral argument held before 
the Trial Court on February 1, 1982, with H. Don Sharp 
appearing for Appellant, the parties outlined their position 
before the Court. No mention is made of the claim that 
there were still unresolved issues. The sole claim was that 
Respondent's death before the actual papers were signed made 
the oral judgment stated at the conclusion of the trial 
void. The claim in Appellant's brief of substantial unresolved 
issues with the written documents is a new claim raised 
before the Supreme Court for the first time. This Court has 
clearly held that issues raised for the first time on appeal 
are not considered and therefore this Court can disregard 
that portion of the Appellant's argument. See Turtle Management, 
Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 
1982). 
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CONCLUSION 
This is a case where the judgment nunc pro tune was 
properly granted and where the Trial Court, which should and 
does have discretion to take this proper action, was clearly 
justified by the record. The Trial Court had the advantage 
of reviewing the long-time separation, the different assets 
owned by the parties, the number of ·marriages, the finality 
of the divorce they were seeking, and the equity of the 
parties as to where the family farm asset should go with 
Respondent's sudden untimely death. 
-
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this '_) ... -..day of July, 1982. 
HILLYARD, LOW & ANDERSON 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the :11__ day of July, 1982, I 
mailed two (2) true and correct copies of the above and 
foregoing REPLY BRIEF by placing same in the United States 
Mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to the following: 
Pete N. Vlahos 
Vlahos, Perkins & Sharp 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Secretary 
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